Lithuania leads 17-nation coalition demanding EU action against Russian GNSS interference
Lithuanian Transport Minister Eugenijus Sabutis has mobilised a coalition of 17 European Union transport and digital affairs ministers to demand coordinated EU action against systematic interference with Global Navigation Satellite Systems originating from Russia and Belarus.
His joint letter to the European Commission leadership on Tuesday warns that deliberate jamming and spoofing of GNSS poses direct threats to strategic sectors including transport, energy and telecommunications across the Baltic Sea region. Recent reports indicate that GNSS disruptions have led to flight diversions and maritime navigation errors, raising concerns about safety and economic stability.
‘The current security environment demands a unified response to hybrid threats posed by hostile regimes, as well as close cooperation to strengthen Europe’s preparedness and resilience,'”‘ Sabutis stated. ‘”‘Disruptions to GNSS signals have a direct impact on strategic sectors such as transport, energy, and telecommunications.'”‘
Lithuania has documented over 440 cases of GNSS interference in its airspace since January 2025, marking a tenfold increase compared to the previous year.
The coalition includes ministers from Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Germany, Slovakia, Finland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark and Romania, representing a broad geographic sweep of EU member states concerned about the escalating interference.
The letter, addressed to High Representative Kaja Kallas, Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius, Transport Commissioner Apostolos Tzitzikostas and other Commission members, emphasizes that GNSS interference cases observed since 2022 are ‘not random incidents but a systematic, deliberate action by Russia and Belarus.’
The ministers characterize the interference as potential hybrid attacks on strategic radio spectrum essential for modern technology, regional safety and security, particularly affecting civil aviation and maritime navigation in the Baltic Sea region.
Two primary types of interference have been documented: jamming, which blocks satellite signals, and spoofing, which sends false positioning data to receivers, potentially causing navigation systems to provide incorrect location information.
The coalition demands increased EU diplomatic pressure on Russia and Belarus, including potential legal action against individuals and entities involved in deliberate GNSS interference. The ministers argue that such systematic disruption represents a form of hybrid warfare requiring coordinated European response.
Immediate actions proposed include intensifying radio frequency monitoring across member states and enhancing civil-military coordination mechanisms for shared monitoring, data exchange and response to interference incidents. Lithuania has already strengthened its airspace monitoring capabilities, deploying advanced detection systems to track GNSS disruptions.
The ministers also call for accelerating deployment of interference-resistant GNSS services, particularly anti-spoofing features of Europe’s Galileo satellite navigation system, and upgrading conventional navigation infrastructure as backup systems.
Lithuania’s leadership role reflects its position as a frontline state facing persistent Russian pressure and its expertise in identifying hybrid threats. The Baltic states have been particularly vocal about Russian interference with critical infrastructure since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.
While the ministers’ statement focuses on direct GNSS interference affecting aviation and maritime navigation, Western officials have warned that Russia’s shadow fleet has been actively using spoofing techniques to obscure vessel locations. Intelligence reports indicate that oil tankers linked to Russian entities have manipulated satellite signals to disguise their routes, making it more difficult to track sanctions violations.
